What people can do on an aircraft now comes from their role there, and
administrators set what each role allows (Admin → Roles).
- Roles are installation-wide sets of permissions (31, grouped as flying,
squawks and notes, maintenance records, imports and exports, the
aircraft, notifications). Seeing an aircraft's records needs none.
- Built in: Owner (always every permission, so an aircraft can always be
managed), Mechanic (shop maintenance: logbook, signing, components,
inspections, ADs, squawks, reminders), Pilot (what pilots could do
before) and Viewer (view only). Administrators can change all but
Owner's, and add their own; a role can be deleted once nobody has it.
- Existing owners and pilots keep exactly what they could do.
- Admin → Users → a user lists their role on every aircraft, to change,
remove or add. On the aircraft's Access page, anyone who manages people
hands out roles, but only an Owner can give or take away Owner, nobody
changes their own (except administrators), and an aircraft always
keeps an Owner (AircraftAccess).
- Controllers declare the permission each action needs; a request that
changes something with none declared is refused (and raises in
development and tests), and a test walks every route to check.
- Weekly reminders and overdue alerts go to roles that get reminders;
the DRS reminder also needs Manage ADs. The API follows the person's
role; its owners_only error is now not_permitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Personal tokens (Profile → API tokens) act as their owner; integration
tokens (Admin → Integrations) reach chosen aircraft and scopes, and their
writes name the person they're for (SAM-On-Behalf-Of). Tokens are stored
hashed, shown once, revocable, with last use recorded.
- GET aircraft, components, due list, inspections, ADs, logbook entries and
squawks; POST/PATCH squawks with external_ref links to the other system.
- Idempotency-Key for safe retries, paging, JSON errors, rate limits.
- Record history keeps the token with each change (in the hashed payload).
- Webhooks (squawk created/updated/resolved, entry signed), HMAC-signed,
retried, never sent to the server itself; deliveries listed for admins.
- The outbound address check is shared by AirTrail and webhooks; reporting a
squawk is announced the same way from the form and the API.
- docs/guide/api.md: the API reference.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Requests run in the viewer's zone: Profile -> Time zone, else their
device's (a tz cookie set from the browser), else the installation's;
times show in it and "today" is the local date (a new flight's date)
- Docker's TZ sets the installation zone (default UTC): scheduled jobs run
on its clock (recurring.yml), and it's used before a device's zone is known
- The weekly reminder email is worked out in the recipient's zone
- Signatures, record history and exports keep exact UTC timestamps
- users.time_zone; README, .env.example and guide updated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Views use lazy t(".key") lookups; sentences with values or links stay
whole (interpolation, _html keys); counts use one/other plurals
- Stored-value labels (statuses, types, priorities...) are LabelSets read
from labels: in the current locale; field names and validation messages
under activerecord:; flash and activity text under flash:
- Services, models, helpers, mailer subjects, the logbook PDF, procedures
templates, records package README and transcription warnings localized;
the PDF reuses LogbookEntry#certification_statement instead of a copy
- Scripts read js: strings from a JSON tag via app/javascript/i18n.js
- Dates through I18n.l (app, weekday, month_year, long formats); html lang
follows the locale
- APP_LOCALE picks the language (falls back to English); missing
translations raise in development and tests
- README: Translating section and APP_LOCALE
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- 10 failed sign-ins in a row (password, authenticator code, or password
at signing) lock an account for 15 minutes from any address; the user
is emailed; admins can unlock. Same message as a wrong password.
- Passwords: at least 12 characters (max 72), refused if found in Have I
Been Pwned (k-anonymity range API; fails open; PWNED_PASSWORDS_CHECK=false)
- Optional TOTP (authenticator app) with 10 recovery codes for password
and emailed-link sign-in, and at signing (auth method password_totp);
codes accepted once; admins can reset; SSO sign-in unaffected
- Demo/test passwords updated; guide, README and procedures document
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Sign an entry: review exactly what's certified, choose a current
certificate (eligibility checked: pilot only for preventive maintenance,
inspections need their result and time), re-enter the password or sign
in again with SSO (prompt=login, within 5 minutes), and confirm the
"Certified by" statement (43.9 return to service, 43.11(a)(5) for
inspections, preventive maintenance for pilots)
- The signature stores signer, certificate, statement, UTC time, how they
authenticated, IP/browser, a SHA-256 fingerprint of the entry's content
and a readable snapshot; an HMAC seal covers the signature record. Status
shows Valid / Superseded / Altered since signing. The signer is emailed
- Signed entries (and their sub-components) can't be edited or deleted;
a correction entry, once signed, supersedes the original (kept)
- Owners invite an outside mechanic by email to sign one entry: one-time,
14-day link; they create or use their own account and certificate and
see only that entry
- Admins can disable accounts (signed out, can't sign in or sign; past
signatures kept); users with signatures can't be deleted
- Printouts show the electronic signature and fingerprint; archives carry
signatures (marked imported, with their origin) and corrections
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Admin -> About: Email card (delivery, server, encryption, login name,
From; never the password) and a "Send test email" button that sends
immediately and shows the SMTP error if it fails
- SMTP: implicit TLS on port 465 (or SMTP_TLS=true), auth only with a
username, 10-15 s timeouts
- "Email me a sign-in link": single-use (spent by any later sign-in via a
monotonic users.last_signed_in_at), 15-minute expiry, confirm step so
mail scanners can't use it up, same answer for unknown addresses, rate
limited, off when PASSWORD_LOGIN=false
- Admin -> Users shows last sign-in
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- SSO via OmniAuth OpenID Connect (Authentik, Keycloak, …): link by stable
subject, by verified email, or from the profile; optional auto-create,
admin-group sync, and turning password sign-in off
- Current password required to change email or password; password changes
and resets sign out other sessions; idle sessions expire after 30 days;
"sign out everywhere else"; session reset on sign-in
- Rate-limit password resets; scope squawk components to the aircraft
- Strict Content Security Policy with nonces (inline handlers removed),
Permissions-Policy and COOP headers; file links expire after an hour
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AD import (owners, ADs tab → Import from FAA DRS):
- Upload a DRS export (.xlsx recommended, .csv works), preview, confirm.
- Per AD: track, not applicable, or skip, with suggestions and flags for
superseded/non-current ADs, model mismatches, appliance and STC-only
ADs, repetitive actions, and older ADs this one supersedes.
- ADs are matched by number; re-importing updates existing ADs from the
FAA data (preview lists what will change) without touching compliance
records, recurrence or applicability. Superseded tracked ADs are
updated and flagged rather than skipped.
- DRS's Excel export hyperlinks each AD number to its DRS page; those
links are kept (http(s) only). DRS ids aren't derivable from the AD
number, so no links are guessed.
Also:
- Per-aircraft "not applicable" AD determinations (N/A badge, quick
action, excluded from airworthiness).
- AD numbers link to their DRS document in the AD list, compliance
history (now with description, logbook/inspection links) and share page.
- Saved DRS search link per aircraft with an "Open in DRS" button.
- Upload storage extracted to a StoredUpload concern shared with the
flight import.
- document_url / drs_search_url added in their own guarded migration
(they were briefly in an already-applied migration).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rails 8.1 + SQLite rewrite of marbindrakon/simple-aircraft-manager,
designed to self-host as a single container (Solid Queue/Cache/Cable,
Active Storage on disk, Hotwire + importmap, Tailwind).
- Airworthiness engine ported from health/services.py (ADs, grounding
squawks, inspection recurrency, component replacement)
- Hours updates and flight logs cascading to in-service components,
optional airworthiness enforcement
- Components, squawks, ADs, inspections, logbook, documents, major
records, oil/fuel consumption stats and charts, activity log
- Admin/owner/pilot RBAC and public share links (status/maintenance)
- Docker Compose and Kamal deployment, env-driven production config
- Service and integration tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>