11 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 d956cfbe83 Records package viewer: read-only, no account needed
SAM_VIEWER=true (set only by the records package's
viewer/docker-compose.yml) makes the app a read-only copy of an archive,
for whoever receives the records: `docker compose up`, then open
http://localhost:3000.

- At start (bin/docker-entrypoint → sam:viewer:prepare) the package's
  .sam.zip, mounted read-only, is imported once.
- No sign-in: everyone browses as a built-in account. Nothing can be
  changed: any request but GET/HEAD is refused, no role permission
  applies (so no edit buttons), and there's no sign-out or profile. A
  banner names the archive and when it was exported.
- It refuses to start, and every page answers 503, when the database
  has any other account, so turning it on for a real installation stops
  the app instead of exposing its records.
- The viewer listens on 127.0.0.1 only, and skips scheduled jobs
  (reminders, backups, AD searches).
- Docs: the package README (three steps now), Access & sharing, README
  settings and features, the suggested recordkeeping procedures.

Checked end to end with a built image and a real records package: the
archive imported at start, pages browsed without an account, a change
refused, and the container refusing to start once an account existed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-15 20:03:56 -05:00
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 d8cd462194 Configurable roles: Owner, Mechanic, Pilot, Viewer and custom roles
What people can do on an aircraft now comes from their role there, and
administrators set what each role allows (Admin → Roles).

- Roles are installation-wide sets of permissions (31, grouped as flying,
  squawks and notes, maintenance records, imports and exports, the
  aircraft, notifications). Seeing an aircraft's records needs none.
- Built in: Owner (always every permission, so an aircraft can always be
  managed), Mechanic (shop maintenance: logbook, signing, components,
  inspections, ADs, squawks, reminders), Pilot (what pilots could do
  before) and Viewer (view only). Administrators can change all but
  Owner's, and add their own; a role can be deleted once nobody has it.
- Existing owners and pilots keep exactly what they could do.
- Admin → Users → a user lists their role on every aircraft, to change,
  remove or add. On the aircraft's Access page, anyone who manages people
  hands out roles, but only an Owner can give or take away Owner, nobody
  changes their own (except administrators), and an aircraft always
  keeps an Owner (AircraftAccess).
- Controllers declare the permission each action needs; a request that
  changes something with none declared is refused (and raises in
  development and tests), and a test walks every route to check.
- Weekly reminders and overdue alerts go to roles that get reminders;
  the DRS reminder also needs Manage ADs. The API follows the person's
  role; its owners_only error is now not_permitted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-15 17:43:38 -05:00
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 bffdea937c REST API v1: tokens, read endpoints, squawks, webhooks
- Personal tokens (Profile → API tokens) act as their owner; integration
  tokens (Admin → Integrations) reach chosen aircraft and scopes, and their
  writes name the person they're for (SAM-On-Behalf-Of). Tokens are stored
  hashed, shown once, revocable, with last use recorded.
- GET aircraft, components, due list, inspections, ADs, logbook entries and
  squawks; POST/PATCH squawks with external_ref links to the other system.
- Idempotency-Key for safe retries, paging, JSON errors, rate limits.
- Record history keeps the token with each change (in the hashed payload).
- Webhooks (squawk created/updated/resolved, entry signed), HMAC-signed,
  retried, never sent to the server itself; deliveries listed for admins.
- The outbound address check is shared by AirTrail and webhooks; reporting a
  squawk is announced the same way from the form and the API.
- docs/guide/api.md: the API reference.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-14 19:05:10 -05:00
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 9662c7ae16 Time zones: each person's own, and TZ for the installation
- Requests run in the viewer's zone: Profile -> Time zone, else their
  device's (a tz cookie set from the browser), else the installation's;
  times show in it and "today" is the local date (a new flight's date)
- Docker's TZ sets the installation zone (default UTC): scheduled jobs run
  on its clock (recurring.yml), and it's used before a device's zone is known
- The weekly reminder email is worked out in the recipient's zone
- Signatures, record history and exports keep exact UTC timestamps
- users.time_zone; README, .env.example and guide updated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-14 07:49:22 -05:00
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 89ed0a76f9 Move all user-facing text into config/locales/en.yml for localization
- Views use lazy t(".key") lookups; sentences with values or links stay
  whole (interpolation, _html keys); counts use one/other plurals
- Stored-value labels (statuses, types, priorities...) are LabelSets read
  from labels: in the current locale; field names and validation messages
  under activerecord:; flash and activity text under flash:
- Services, models, helpers, mailer subjects, the logbook PDF, procedures
  templates, records package README and transcription warnings localized;
  the PDF reuses LogbookEntry#certification_statement instead of a copy
- Scripts read js: strings from a JSON tag via app/javascript/i18n.js
- Dates through I18n.l (app, weekday, month_year, long formats); html lang
  follows the locale
- APP_LOCALE picks the language (falls back to English); missing
  translations raise in development and tests
- README: Translating section and APP_LOCALE

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 22:08:20 -05:00
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 14316bb60f Sign-in hardening: lockout, stronger passwords, authenticator codes
- 10 failed sign-ins in a row (password, authenticator code, or password
  at signing) lock an account for 15 minutes from any address; the user
  is emailed; admins can unlock. Same message as a wrong password.
- Passwords: at least 12 characters (max 72), refused if found in Have I
  Been Pwned (k-anonymity range API; fails open; PWNED_PASSWORDS_CHECK=false)
- Optional TOTP (authenticator app) with 10 recovery codes for password
  and emailed-link sign-in, and at signing (auth method password_totp);
  codes accepted once; admins can reset; SSO sign-in unaffected
- Demo/test passwords updated; guide, README and procedures document

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 15:17:56 -05:00
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 d719f663bc Electronic signatures on logbook entries (AC 120-78B chapter 2)
- Sign an entry: review exactly what's certified, choose a current
  certificate (eligibility checked: pilot only for preventive maintenance,
  inspections need their result and time), re-enter the password or sign
  in again with SSO (prompt=login, within 5 minutes), and confirm the
  "Certified by" statement (43.9 return to service, 43.11(a)(5) for
  inspections, preventive maintenance for pilots)
- The signature stores signer, certificate, statement, UTC time, how they
  authenticated, IP/browser, a SHA-256 fingerprint of the entry's content
  and a readable snapshot; an HMAC seal covers the signature record. Status
  shows Valid / Superseded / Altered since signing. The signer is emailed
- Signed entries (and their sub-components) can't be edited or deleted;
  a correction entry, once signed, supersedes the original (kept)
- Owners invite an outside mechanic by email to sign one entry: one-time,
  14-day link; they create or use their own account and certificate and
  see only that entry
- Admins can disable accounts (signed out, can't sign in or sign; past
  signatures kept); users with signatures can't be deleted
- Printouts show the electronic signature and fingerprint; archives carry
  signatures (marked imported, with their origin) and corrections

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 13:12:04 -05:00
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 4f548f3874 Email test button and sign-in by emailed link
- Admin -> About: Email card (delivery, server, encryption, login name,
  From; never the password) and a "Send test email" button that sends
  immediately and shows the SMTP error if it fails
- SMTP: implicit TLS on port 465 (or SMTP_TLS=true), auth only with a
  username, 10-15 s timeouts
- "Email me a sign-in link": single-use (spent by any later sign-in via a
  monotonic users.last_signed_in_at), 15-minute expiry, confirm step so
  mail scanners can't use it up, same answer for unknown addresses, rate
  limited, off when PASSWORD_LOGIN=false
- Admin -> Users shows last sign-in

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 09:27:57 -05:00
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 ac4da93aaf Security hardening and OpenID Connect single sign-on
- SSO via OmniAuth OpenID Connect (Authentik, Keycloak, …): link by stable
  subject, by verified email, or from the profile; optional auto-create,
  admin-group sync, and turning password sign-in off
- Current password required to change email or password; password changes
  and resets sign out other sessions; idle sessions expire after 30 days;
  "sign out everywhere else"; session reset on sign-in
- Rate-limit password resets; scope squawk components to the aircraft
- Strict Content Security Policy with nonces (inline handlers removed),
  Permissions-Policy and COOP headers; file links expire after an hour

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 08:38:25 -05:00
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 b75fd7cf62 Import ADs from FAA DRS exports; N/A determinations and DRS links
AD import (owners, ADs tab → Import from FAA DRS):
- Upload a DRS export (.xlsx recommended, .csv works), preview, confirm.
- Per AD: track, not applicable, or skip, with suggestions and flags for
  superseded/non-current ADs, model mismatches, appliance and STC-only
  ADs, repetitive actions, and older ADs this one supersedes.
- ADs are matched by number; re-importing updates existing ADs from the
  FAA data (preview lists what will change) without touching compliance
  records, recurrence or applicability. Superseded tracked ADs are
  updated and flagged rather than skipped.
- DRS's Excel export hyperlinks each AD number to its DRS page; those
  links are kept (http(s) only). DRS ids aren't derivable from the AD
  number, so no links are guessed.

Also:
- Per-aircraft "not applicable" AD determinations (N/A badge, quick
  action, excluded from airworthiness).
- AD numbers link to their DRS document in the AD list, compliance
  history (now with description, logbook/inspection links) and share page.
- Saved DRS search link per aircraft with an "Open in DRS" button.
- Upload storage extracted to a StoredUpload concern shared with the
  flight import.
- document_url / drs_search_url added in their own guarded migration
  (they were briefly in an already-applied migration).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-05 18:35:38 -05:00
rickyandClaude Opus 5.5 38df19c331 Initial commit: Rails port of Simple Aircraft Manager
Rails 8.1 + SQLite rewrite of marbindrakon/simple-aircraft-manager,
designed to self-host as a single container (Solid Queue/Cache/Cable,
Active Storage on disk, Hotwire + importmap, Tailwind).

- Airworthiness engine ported from health/services.py (ADs, grounding
  squawks, inspection recurrency, component replacement)
- Hours updates and flight logs cascading to in-service components,
  optional airworthiness enforcement
- Components, squawks, ADs, inspections, logbook, documents, major
  records, oil/fuel consumption stats and charts, activity log
- Admin/owner/pilot RBAC and public share links (status/maintenance)
- Docker Compose and Kamal deployment, env-driven production config
- Service and integration tests

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-04 17:59:08 -05:00