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Sign-in hardening: lockout, stronger passwords, authenticator codes
- 10 failed sign-ins in a row (password, authenticator code, or password at signing) lock an account for 15 minutes from any address; the user is emailed; admins can unlock. Same message as a wrong password. - Passwords: at least 12 characters (max 72), refused if found in Have I Been Pwned (k-anonymity range API; fails open; PWNED_PASSWORDS_CHECK=false) - Optional TOTP (authenticator app) with 10 recovery codes for password and emailed-link sign-in, and at signing (auth method password_totp); codes accepted once; admins can reset; SSO sign-in unaffected - Demo/test passwords updated; guide, README and procedures document Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
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<ol class="<%= p_ %> list-decimal pl-5">
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<li>The signer opens the entry and chooses Sign. The entry is shown in full exactly as it will be certified (AC 2.2.4).</li>
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<li>They choose one of their own current certificates. The statement they will certify is shown with it, under the heading “Certified by” (2.2.2): for maintenance, “I certify that the work described in this entry was performed in accordance with 14 CFR Part 43, and I approve it for return to service with respect to that work”; for inspections, the 43.11(a)(5) statement; for preventive maintenance by a pilot, the corresponding statement.</li>
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<li>They prove who they are again: their password, or signing in again with single sign-on within the last five minutes (2.2.6), and confirm that they are signing with intent to sign (2.1.2.4–5).</li>
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<li>They prove who they are again: their password (with a code from their authenticator app, if they use one), or signing in again with single sign-on within the last five minutes (2.2.6), and confirm that they are signing with intent to sign (2.1.2.4–5).</li>
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<li>The system records the signer, the certificate (kind and number), the statement, the time (UTC), how they authenticated, their network address and browser, a SHA-256 fingerprint of the entry's content and a readable copy of it, and a server seal (HMAC) over the signature record (2.1.2.6, 2.2.5). The signer is told on screen and by email (2.2.3).</li>
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<li>Once signed, the entry and its components can't be edited or deleted (2.1.2.7–8, 2.2.7). A correction is made as a new entry that, once signed, supersedes the original; the original and its signature are kept and marked superseded (2.2.8).</li>
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<li>When someone no longer needs access, the responsible person disables their account: they can no longer sign in or sign, and their past signatures stay valid (2.2.6.4).</li>
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@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
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<h2 class="<%= h2 %>">7. Recordkeeping system controls</h2>
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<ul class="<%= p_ %> list-disc pl-5">
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<li><strong>Controlled access (3.2.1):</strong> personal accounts; roles per aircraft; sessions end after 30 days unused; rate-limited sign-in; changing an email or password needs the current password.</li>
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<li><strong>Controlled access (3.2.1):</strong> personal accounts; roles per aircraft; passwords of at least 12 characters, refused if known from a data breach; optional authenticator-app codes; accounts locked for 15 minutes after 10 failed sign-ins (the user is emailed); rate-limited sign-in; sessions end after 30 days unused; changing an email or password needs the current password.</li>
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<li><strong>Record preservation (3.2.2):</strong> every change to a maintenance record is kept with who, when and what changed, in a hash chain per aircraft that can't be edited; signed entries are locked.</li>
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<li><strong>Confidential information (3.2.3):</strong> records are visible only to the aircraft's users, and to share links an owner creates (scoped and optionally expiring).</li>
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<li><strong>Data corruption (3.2.4):</strong> nightly, the history chains and every signature's seal and fingerprint are checked; administrators are emailed on any problem.</li>
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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<%= f.errors_summary %>
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<%= f.field :name %>
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<%= f.field :email_address, as: :email, label: "Email", required: true %>
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<%= f.field :password, as: :password, hint: (user.persisted? ? "Leave blank to keep current password." : "At least 8 characters."), autocomplete: "new-password" %>
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<%= f.field :password, as: :password, hint: (user.persisted? ? "Leave blank to keep current password." : "At least #{User::PASSWORD_MIN} characters; not one known from a data breach."), autocomplete: "new-password" %>
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<%= f.field :password_confirmation, as: :password %>
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<%= f.field :admin, as: :checkbox, label: "Administrator", hint: "Admins can see and edit every aircraft and manage users." %>
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<div class="flex gap-2"><%= f.submit "Save" %><%= link_to "Cancel", admin_users_path, class: "btn-secondary" %></div>
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@@ -3,13 +3,15 @@
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<section class="card"><table class="table">
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<thead><tr><th>Name</th><th>Email</th><th>Aircraft</th><th>Last sign-in</th><th></th></tr></thead>
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<tbody><% @users.each do |u| %><tr>
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<td><%= u.name %> <% if u.admin? %><span class="badge-blue">Admin</span><% end %><% if u.sso_uid? %> <span class="badge-gray" title="Signs in with <%= Sso.label %>"><%= Sso.label %></span><% end %></td>
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<td><%= u.name %> <% if u.admin? %><span class="badge-blue">Admin</span><% end %><% if u.sso_uid? %> <span class="badge-gray" title="Signs in with <%= Sso.label %>"><%= Sso.label %></span><% end %><% if u.otp_enabled? %> <span class="badge-green" title="Authenticator app on">2FA</span><% end %><% if u.locked? %> <span class="badge-red" title="Too many failed sign-ins">Locked</span><% end %></td>
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<td><%= u.email_address %><% if u.certificates.any? %><div class="text-xs text-slate-500"><%= u.certificates.map { "#{_1.short_label} #{_1.number}" }.join(", ") %></div><% end %></td>
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<td class="text-xs"><%= u.aircraft_roles.map { "#{_1.aircraft.tail_number} (#{_1.role})" }.join(", ").presence || "—" %></td>
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<td class="text-xs text-slate-500"><%= u.last_signed_in_at ? "#{time_ago_in_words(u.last_signed_in_at)} ago" : "never" %></td>
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<td class="whitespace-nowrap text-right">
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<% if u.disabled? %><span class="badge-red mr-1">Disabled</span><%= button_to "Enable", enable_admin_user_path(u), method: :patch, class: "btn-secondary btn-sm", form: { class: "inline" } %>
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<% elsif u != current_user %><%= button_to "Disable", disable_admin_user_path(u), method: :patch, class: "btn-secondary btn-sm", form: { class: "inline", data: { turbo_confirm: "Disable #{u.email_address}? They'll be signed out and can't sign in or sign entries. Their past signatures are kept." } } %><% end %>
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<% if u.locked? %><%= button_to "Unlock", unlock_admin_user_path(u), method: :patch, class: "btn-secondary btn-sm", form: { class: "inline" } %><% end %>
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<% if u.otp_enabled? %><%= button_to "Reset 2FA", reset_two_factor_admin_user_path(u), method: :patch, class: "btn-secondary btn-sm", title: "Turn off their authenticator app (lost phone)", form: { class: "inline", data: { turbo_confirm: "Turn off two-factor for #{u.email_address}? Only do this after confirming it's really them." } } %><% end %>
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<%= link_to "Edit", edit_admin_user_path(u), class: "btn-secondary btn-sm" %></td>
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</tr><% end %></tbody>
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</table></section>
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